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PREFAcE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared 
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of 
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24 was 
established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating 
strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international 
financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within 
the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries. 
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Division on Globalization 
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in 
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial 
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce 
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional 
reform. 
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings 
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers 
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of 
the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) 
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums. 
 
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support 
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from 
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24. REvISING BASEl 2:  
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Abstract
Since the start of the drafting process of Basel 2 ten years ago the agreement has assumed a central 
position in the reform of international rules on financial regulation. The finalization of Basel 2 has 
proved much more difficult than anticipated by the initiators of the negotiation process owing to the 
complexity of its subject-matter, its global scope and the moving target of what regulatory rules are 
expected to achieve in rapidly changing conditions. These features of Basel 2 are mutually related: its 
complexity reflects the challenge of designing global rules suitable for institutions of different levels 
of sophistication in countries at different levels of development as well as of responding to continuing 
financial innovation and, most recently, to a cross-border financial crisis triggered by inadequate 
control of risks, malpractice and regulatory failures in countries with the most sophisticated financial 
systems.
This paper reviews various aspects of the debate concerning the effects of Basel 2 and of the regulation 
of banking risks. Inevitably it thus takes up issues raised during both the earlier stages of the drafting 
process and more recently after the decision was taken to revise Basel 2 as part of the agenda of 
financial reform in response to the financial crisis which began in 2007. The debate concerning Basel 2 
has been primarily concerned with banking regulation in general, and the problems which have 
received most attention have been those posed by the experience of developed countries. By contrast 
the debate has devoted only limited attention to the likely impact of Basel 2 in emerging-market and 
other developing countries. This paper attempts to redress the balance with respect to the latter. It 
reviews evidence on the global introduction of Basel 2, and examines in greater detail features of the 
introduction of Basel 2 in a small sample of Asian developing countries. It also emphasizes the way in 
which increased attention to the macroprudential dimension of regulation in the agenda for financial 
reform could serve to highlight important connections between regulation and development policy. 
Much of the discussion of revision of Basel 2 as part of the agenda of financial reform has an inevitably 
provisional character since work on the agenda is still ongoing. However, it is already possible to 
identify major problems under headings such as liquidity risk, improved infrastructure for OTC 
derivatives, the compensation of bank staff, the credit rating agencies, accounting standards, and 
the procyclicality of bank lending, all of which headings have intersections with Basel 2. The paper 
summarizes ways in which these problems are being addressed in the reform agenda and some of 
the implications for developing countries. In this context, it draws attention to approaches to these 
problems in the Asian developing countries mentioned above, approaches which in the case of India 
were to a significant extent pre-emptive. ix Revising Basel 2: The Impact of the Financial Crisis and Implications for Developing Countries
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I.  Introduction
In the words of two former senior British finan-
cial regulators “the objective of the new arrangements 
[Basel 2] is to strengthen the soundness and stability 
of the international banking system while maintaining 
sufficient consistency so that capital regulation will 
not be a significant source of competitive inequality 
among internationally active banks” (Davies and 
Green, 2008: 43). Basel 2 sets levels of minimum 
regulatory capital for three categories of banking risk 
– credit, market and operational – according to rules 
which include a multiplicity of different approaches 
(see box 1). This multiplicity reflects the objective 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) to accommodate within these rules banks 
of very different levels of sophistication as well as 
points raised by critics during the long process of 
drafting Basel 2. 
The effects of the rules of Basel 2 on different di-
mensions of banking risk have been extensively debated 
during the long drafting process and during the current 
financial crisis. However, this debate was primarily con-
cerned with regulation and risk management in general 
and devoted only limited attention to the likely impact 
of the introduction of Basel 2 in emerging-market and 
other developing economies. After reviewing infor-
mation concerning global plans for the introduction 
of Basel 2, this paper discusses the rationale of the 
agreement and recent proposals for its revision in the 
light of developments which led to the current crisis. 
The discussion attempts to place these proposals in 
the context of the broader agenda for financial reform 
now being developed. Moreover, it attempts to redress 
the balance with respect to emerging-market and other 
developing countries through consideration of issues 
related to introduction of Basel 2 in their jurisdictions 
as well as a review of approaches to its introduction 
actually adopted in selected countries. 2 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 59
Box 1
OvERvIEw OF ThE BASEl cAPITAl AccORDS
Basel 2 is designed to replace the 1988 Basel Capital Accord (Basel 1).a Both agreements were drawn up 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), a body of banking regulators established in 1974 
which originally consisted of the countries of the G10 and has subsequently been expanded to include all 
countries of the Group of 20 and selected other countries with important financial sectors. The BCBS is 
linked geographically and organizationally to the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements. 
Basel 1 and Basel 2 are agreements on frameworks for assessing the capital adequacy of banks. The 
framework sets rules for the allocation of capital to banks’ exposures to risks through its lending and other 
operations. The agreements have two objectives. One is prudential, namely to help to ensure the strength 
and soundness of banking systems. The other is to help to equalize cross-border competition between banks 
(provide “a level playing field”) by eliminating competitive advantages due to differences among countries 
in their regimes for capital adequacy (a special concern of United States and European banks vis-à-vis 
competitors from Japan in the 1980s).
As a measure of the difference between the value of a bank’s assets and liabilities capital serves as a buffer 
against future, unidentified losses. The capital of banks consists of equity and other financial instruments 
which have the properties of being available to support an institution in times of crisis. 
Financial instruments classified as capital are usually associated with higher rates of return, and are thus 
a more costly way of financing banks’ assets than other liabilities such as deposits. The rate of return on 
capital is a determinant of banks’ pricing of loans and of other transactions involving exposure to risk and 
as such is a factor in their competitiveness vis-à-vis other banks. 
Capital under the initial version of Basel 1 agreed in 1988 was to serve as a buffer against credit risk, i.e. 
that of the failure of borrowers or parties to the other banking transactions to meet their obligations. Under 
the accord capital was to constitute 8 per cent of banks’ risk-weighted assets.
Measurement of these risk-weighted assets was based on the attribution of weights reflecting the credit 
risk of different classes of counterparty (sovereign, OECD or non-OECD, other public sector, corporate, 
etc.). Off-balance-sheet exposures (such as guarantees, various contingent liabilities, and interest-rate 
and exchange-rate derivatives) were converted to their on-balance-sheet equivalents by multiplying them 
by credit conversion factors (CCFs). The resulting figures were then weighted according to the class of 
counterparty as for on-balance-sheet exposures. For example, collateralized documentary credits received 
a CCF of 20 per cent and the resulting on-balance-sheet equivalent would be multiplied by the risk weight 
of the counterparty to which the documentary credit was made available. 
The attribution of credit risk weights (0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 per cent) followed a scheme which favoured 
governments and certain other entities from OECD countries over those from non-OECD countries, and 
banks over other commercial borrowers. Thus, a weight of 0 per cent was attributed to claims on OECD 
governments and central banks, and one of 20 per cent (corresponding to a contribution to minimum capital 
requirements of 1.6 per cent of the nominal value of the exposure) to claims on banks incorporated in OECD 
countries and to banks incorporated in non-OECD countries with a residual maturity of up to one year. A 
weight of 100 per cent was attributed to claims on private sector entities not otherwise specified such as 
non-financial corporations and non-OECD governments. 
Through an amendment in 1996 Basel 1 was extended to cover market risks in banks’ trading books, i.e. 
those due to the impact on a bank’s portfolio of tradable assets of adverse changes in interest and exchange 
rates and in the prices of stocks and other financial instruments. The amendment accommodated two 
alternative ways of setting minimum capital levels for market risk. One involved the use by banks of their 
own internal risk-management models, and the other a standardized methodology under which capital 
requirements are estimated separately for different categories of market risk and then summed to give an 
overall capital charge (as for credit risks).
Basel 1 was originally designed for internationally active banks. However, by the second half of the 
1990s it had become a global standard and had been incorporated into the prudential regimes of more than 3 Revising Basel 2: The Impact of the Financial Crisis and Implications for Developing Countries
100 countries. But Basel 1 was also the subject of increasingly widespread dissatisfaction so that a decision 
was taken to initiate what proved to be the lengthy process of drafting a successor agreement. What was 
intended to be the definitive version of the new accord, Basel 2, became available in mid-2006. However, 
further revisions of Basel 2 are now being drafted to incorporate the lessons learnt as a result of the stresses 
on banks’ solvency during the financial crisis. The package containing the revised version of Basel 2 will 
also include standards for the management of banks’ liquidity risk, whose close connections to solvency, 
the target of Basel 2, were underlined by the crisis.
Basel 2 consists of three Pillars. Under Pillar 1, minimum regulatory capital requirements for credit risk 
are calculated according to two alternative approaches, the Standardized and the Internal Ratings-Based. 
Under the simpler of the two, the Standardized Approach, the measurement of credit risk is based on ratings 
provided by external credit assessment institutions. According to the text of the agreement export credit 
agencies as well as credit rating agencies are indicated for this purpose. However, the expectation of both 
the BCBS and of national authorities is clearly that the role will most frequently be assumed by credit 
rating agencies. Owing to perceived shortcomings in the performance of the major credit rating agencies 
this choice has proved controversial. 
Under the Standardized Approach of Basel 2, entities from OECD countries are no longer favoured over 
those from non-OECD countries. Both banks and non-financial corporations are now differentiated according 
to their credit ratings (of which the BCBS uses those of Standard & Poor’s for illustrative purposes). Thus 
non-financial corporate borrowers rated between AAA and AA- are attributed a weight of 20 per cent, 
those rated between A+ and A- one of 50 per cent, those rated between BBB+ and BB- one of 100 per cent, 
and those rated below BB- one of 150 per cent. Unrated non-financial corporate borrowers are attributed 
a weight of 100 per cent.
Under the Internal Ratings-Based approach, exposures are classified as corporate, sovereign, bank, retail, 
equity, purchased receivables, and specialized lending. For corporate, sovereign, bank and retail exposures, 
subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions with respect to their internal controls and the availability of 
relevant data, banks use their own rating systems to measure some or all of the determinants of credit risk, 
namely the probability of unexpected default, loss given default, exposure at default, and the remaining 
effective maturity of the exposure. Under the Foundation version of the Internal Ratings-Based Approach, 
banks estimate the determinants of default probability but rely on their supervisors for measures of the other 
determinants of credit risk. Under the Advanced version of the Internal Ratings-Based Approach, banks 
also estimate the loss given default, the exposure at default, and the remaining maturity (subject to a floor 
of one year and a ceiling of five years).
For exposures consisting of equity or purchased receivables banks calculate credit risk weights on the basis 
of frameworks which also incorporate to varying degrees banks’ own estimates of the determinants but not 
in accordance with the same formula as corporate, sovereign, bank and retail exposures. Specialized lending 
covers categories of corporate exposure with special characteristics such as project finance, commodities 
finance, and certain kinds of real-estate financing. Under the rules for specialized lending banks that meet 
the supervisory requirements for the estimation of the determination of default probability may use the 
formula prescribed for the Internal Ratings-Based Approach for corporate exposures. Banks not meeting these 
requirements are to use a special set of supervisory categories and risk weights for unexpected losses.
Pillar 1 also contains rules for regulatory capital requirements for market risk which follow the same 
framework as Basel 1 but which are now to be strengthened to cover default risks on trading positions not 
adequately covered by the framework of the 1996 amendment. 
Unlike Basel 1, Basel 2 contains regulatory capital requirements for operational risk which covers losses 
due to events such as human errors or fraudulent behaviour, computer failures or disruptions from external 
events such as earthquakes. Under the Basic Indicator Approach, the simplest of the three options in Basel 
2, the capital charge for operational risk is a percentage of banks’ gross income. Under the Standardized 
Approach to operational risk the capital charge is the sum of specified percentages of banks’ gross income 
or loans for eight business lines. Under the Advanced Measurement Approach to operational risk, the most 
sophisticated option of Basel 2, subject to the satisfaction of more stringent supervisory criteria, banks 
estimate the required capital with their own internal measurement systems.
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II.  Global implementation of Basel 2 
and	the	difficulties	confronting	
developing countries 
Much of the information on implementation 
concerns the number of countries planning to intro-
duce Basel 2. Beyond the raw statistics, however, 
people are usually also interested in having some kind 
of assessment of the realism of the plans for introduc-
tion and, especially for developing countries, of the 
pressures on national supervisors which the introduc-
tion of Basel 2 can be expected to generate. 
Two surveys of the Basel-based Financial Sta-
bility institute in 2004 and 2006 covered the plans of 
regulators in non-Basel-Committee countries for the 
introduction of Basel 2 (Financial Stability Institute, 
2004 and 2006). If a country announces its intention 
to introduce the approaches, options and other rules of 
Basel 2, this means that its regulators will make them 
available to financial firms in their jurisdictions.
Major findings of the 2006 survey were that 
82 of the 98 responding countries planned to in-
troduce Basel 2. This figure rises to 95 when the 
13 member countries of the BCBS (as it was then 
constituted) are added. In comparison with the 2004 
survey, the planned schedule for introduction in the 
2006 survey was less ambitious in many countries. 
For most of the regions there were marked increases 
in the 2006 survey in comparison with the 2004 
survey in the proportions of respondents planning 
to meet the obligations of Pillar 2 (supervisory re-
view) and Pillar 3 (transparency) by 2009. Indeed, 
the data on meeting the obligations of Pillars 2 and 3 
suggest a widespread and understandable tendency 
among responding countries to give first priority in 
plans for the introduction of Basel 2 to strengthening 
Also unlike Basel 1, Basel 2 contains detailed rules concerning securitisation exposures, i.e. the exposures 
for a bank after the transfer of the risks of assets on its balance sheet to outside investors, a category of 
risk which was omitted from Basel 1. The rules of Basel 2 are intended to establish stringent conditions 
for the recognition of the transfer of risk from banks’ balance sheets and to set regulatory capital charges 
for the risks remaining with banks. These rules are currently being strengthened in response to banks’ risk 
experience due to their securitisation exposures during the financial crisis. 
Under Basel 2, the minimum regulatory capital ratio remains at the 8-per-cent figure of Basel 1. The 
denominator of this ratio consists of estimated exposures for credit, market and operational risk. The 
numerator consists of capital as in Basel 1 but after adjustment in certain ways. Conceptually the most 
important of these adjustments is the exclusion of risks corresponding to several categories of expected 
losses from the denominator of the ratio and of banks’ corresponding loss provisions from capital in the 
numerator. This exclusion brings Basel 2 more into line with traditional banking practice according to which 
expected losses are covered by loss provisions, while capital is intended to cover unexpected losses.
Pillars 2 and 3 of Basel 2 are concerned with supervisory review of capital adequacy and the achievement 
of discipline in banks’ risk management through disclosure to investors. Under the guidelines of Pillar 2, 
supervisors are to prescribe additional regulatory capital not only for the credit, market and operational risks 
of Pillar 1 if they judge this to be necessary for supervisory reasons but also for risks not covered under 
these three headings, such as liquidity risk (which covers banks’ ability to obtain required funding and the 
prices at which it can sell assets in financial markets) and interest-rate risks due to changes in the margins 
between the rates at which banks lend and borrow.
Pillar 3 specifies rules for the disclosure of information concerning banks’ capital and risk management. 
These rules are intended to enable financial market participants as well as supervisors to subject these to 
scrutiny which will reinforce the effectiveness of Pillars 1 and 2. 
a  For the full 2006 text of Basel 2, see BCBS (2006). As explained below, this text is now being revised in the light 
of lessons learnt during the current financial crisis.5 Revising Basel 2: The Impact of the Financial Crisis and Implications for Developing Countries
supervisory capacity – Pillar 2 – and disclosure 
standards – Pillar 3.
During the drafting process for Basel 2, there 
was widespread concern over the difficulties likely 
to be posed to introduction by limitations on the 
technical capacity of banks and supervisors. So it is 
natural to ask the question whether the plans in the 
replies to the Financial Stability Institute’s survey 
are realistic. Available information does not permit 
a definite answer to this question but a number of 
pertinent points can be raised.
The technical capacity of banks and supervisors 
in many developing countries in comparison with 
their counterparts in industrialised countries should 
not be underestimated. Indeed, events during the last 
decade – and more especially during financial crisis 
– have drawn attention to the sometimes egregious 
shortcomings of both banks and supervisors in in-
dustrial countries. In comparing the risk management 
capabilities of the large international banks of indus-
trial countries and of banks of developing countries 
it is important to remember that the activities of the 
latter are generally more focused on traditional com-
mercial banking and less on the new products and 
services which are proving more difficult to manage, 
control and supervise. 
Nevertheless, the strains on national supervi-
sory capacity of introducing Basel 2 in developing 
countries should not be underestimated. Information 
bearing on the scale of these strains can be illustrated 
from the Financial Stability Institute’s 2004 survey 
which found that non-BCBS countries expected train-
ing on Basel 2-related topics would be necessary for 
about 9,400 supervisors or almost 25 per cent of the 
countries’ supervisory staff.
The tasks in developing countries entailed by 
the introduction of the Standardized Approach for 
credit risk in Basel 2 are considerable but should be 
manageable. The requirements for introducing the 
Foundation and Advanced versions of the Internal 
Ratings-Based Approach as well as the more ad-
vanced approaches for operational risk, are a potential 
source of greater difficulties. 
These more advanced approaches of Basel 2 
require data covering substantial periods and the 
meeting of standards for validation by banks them-
selves and their supervisors. In the absence of internal 
sources for the data and models required, banks can 
have recourse to external providers or vendors subject 
to carefully defined conditions. 
In developing countries where key inputs to the 
Foundation version of the Internal Ratings-Based 
Approach for credit risk (loss given default and 
exposure at default) are to be provided not by banks 
but by supervisors, lack of required data and models 
may mean that supervisors as well as banks need to 
have recourse to outside vendors. The danger here 
is that pressures associated with implementation of 
the more advanced options of Basel 2 according 
to a timetable determined by political rather than 
supervisory considerations may lead to failures to 
meet proper validation standards for external data 
and models. 
III. capital standards in relation 
to investment and growth in 
developing countries
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord (Basel 1) was 
not designed with economic development in mind. 
Its objectives, which Basel 2 has left unchanged, 
concerned the stability of the international banking 
system and competitive equality between banks en-
gaged in international lending. 
Although the institutions originally targeted 
by Basel 1 were the internationally active banks of 
the BCBS’s member countries, by 1999 Basel 1 had 
become a global standard in the prudential regimes 
for strictly domestic as well as international banks 
in more than 100 countries. Basel 2 likewise will be 
a global standard, and the plans for the introduction 
of Basel 2 in a large number of developing countries 
raise the question of whether Basel 2 will have a 
developmental impact.
One question raised in this connection is 
whether the rules of Basel 2 concerning banks’ capi-
tal requirements and internal controls will not have 
the effect of throttling categories of developmental 
financing which require a long-term perspective and 
willingness to incur considerable risks. Data bearing 
on this question include historical statistics for banks’ 
capital in different countries. These statistics refer to 
simple leverage, i.e. the ratio of equity to a bank’s 
on-balance-sheet assets (or its inverse) and not to 
the ratio of capital as defined by Basel 1 and Basel 2 6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 59
rules to risk-adjusted assets and off-balance-sheet 
exposures. 
For example, in the United States, the average 
equity-to-total-assets ratio was about 50 per cent in 
1840; about 12 per cent in the late 1920s; and (for the 
25 largest banks) 5 per cent in 1989. Richard Dale, a 
scholar of financial regulation, comments as follows: 
“These high ratios – as they now seem to us – were 
the consequence not of any regulatory action but of 
market forces. That is to say, visibly high equity ratios 
were necessary to maintain depositors’ confidence” 
(Dale, 1992: 170). It should also be noted here that 
under practices common before the United States 
Civil War state banks’ capital was often of highly 
doubtful quality, including as it might stock sub-
scriptions which the organizers had borrowed from 
the very bank being established (Symons and White, 
1991: 25). Data for Asian banks for the first half of 
the 1990s discussed in more detail in box 2 shows 
Box 2
lEvERAGE RATIOS FOR SElEcTED ASIAN EcONOMIES, 1994
The data below for 1994 from Thomson BankWatch on the relation of banks’ capital to their assets for 
selected Asian economies refer to simple leverage calculated as the ratio of a bank’s on-balance-sheet assets 
to equity, and not to the ratio of capital (including non-equity instruments designated as capital under Basel 
rules) to risk-adjusted assets and off-balance-sheet exposures, i.e. the ratio which is the target of Basel 1 
and Basel 2 (Delhaise, 1998: appendix 4). The 8-per-cent minimum capital ratio of Basel 1 corresponds 
to a leverage (assets/capital) ratio of approximately 12 only if the banks’ loans and other exposures are 
attributed risk weightings of 100 per cent. In the numerators of the leverage ratios for the Asian economies, 
no allowance is made for the less than 100-per-cent credit weighting attributed under the rules of Basel 1 to 
low-risk exposures on banks’ balance sheets. Nor generally are off-balance-sheet exposures included in the 
ratio. Moreover the denominator generally excludes non-equity capital.a These differences should be borne 
in mind in comparing historical figures for banks’ leverage with a Basel-based benchmark. 1994 figures for 
the leverage ratios of banks in selected Asian economies are as follows: 
Taiwan Province of China 5.32 (new banks) and 18.93 (established banks);    ▪
Philippines 6.87;    ▪
Singapore 7.74;    ▪
Hong Kong, China (excluding HSBC), 8.71;    ▪
Republic of Korea 11.01 (old merchant banks), 14.2 (country banks), 22.245 (nationwide banks)    ▪
and 23.78 (specialized banks); 
Pakistan 11.16 (new banks) and 31.46 (established banks);    ▪
Indonesia 11.26 (private banks) and 16.17 (state banks),    ▪
Thailand 11.69;    ▪
Viet Nam 12.41;    ▪
Macao, China, 12.59;    ▪
India 16.82 (commercial banks) and 28.44 (state banks):    ▪
Malaysia 15.08;    ▪
China 17.29 (banks incorporated in Hong Kong, China)   ▪
China 25.33;    ▪
Bangladesh 31.11.   ▪
Thus at least half of the groupings of banks specified in the Thomson BankWatch data for 1994 probably 
had leverage ratios no higher than would have been compatible with the rules of Basel 1 (which many of 
the economies had adopted or were about to adopt, though implementation of this measure probably would 
have been at most at a highly preliminary stage).
a   Rules of thumb sometimes applied here are that leverage of 12 corresponds to a Basel 1 capital-to-assets ratio of 
11 per cent rather than 8 per cent, and leverage of 20 to a Basel 1 capital-to-assets ratio of 6.5 per cent. 7 Revising Basel 2: The Impact of the Financial Crisis and Implications for Developing Countries
that half of the national bank groupings probably 
had leverage levels no higher than would have been 
compatible with the rules of Basel 1.
Thus, partial as they are, the information con-
cerning the United States and Asian countries do 
not point to a strong connection between banks’ 
capital-to-assets ratios and the pace of economic 
development. Assessment of banks’ contribution to 
development should indeed include the structure and 
evolution of their balance sheets. But assessment 
should not place too much emphasis on leverage or 
capital ratios at the expense of other indicators such 
as the scale and sectoral distribution of lending, 
loans-to-deposits ratios, liquidity and net interest 
margins. 
Explicit references to development financing 
in the text of Basel 2 are difficult to find. None the 
less important techniques of development finance 
can be accommodated under the rules of Basel 2 
for credit risk mitigation, a term which covers loan 
collateralization, guarantees and credit derivatives. 
Guarantees are a standard technique by means of 
which a public entity can substitute exposure to its 
credit risk for that of another borrower. The lower 
credit risk of lending backed by state guarantees is 
recognized in Basel 2.
Other provisions of Basel 2, which may be use-
ful in the context of lending for development are its 
preferential credit weightings for lending to small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Some of the 
relevant rules for such weightings are to be found 
under those for retail exposures. 
Nevertheless, there are legitimate concerns as 
to the developmental implications of Basel 2’s un-
derlying premises about the nature of a good banking 
model. Pushed too far, these could prove harmful.
The premises of Basel 2 about the relationship 
between a bank and its counterparties are part of the 
now generally accepted business model for banking 
in the member countries of the Basel Committee and 
the rest of developed world. But they diverge to vary-
ing degrees from the premises of banking models in 
several emerging-market countries.
In Basel 2 the assumed relationship is arms-
length. This implies that decisions about lending, 
investment and the provision of other banking 
services are based on reasoned analysis of the 
counterparty’s capacity to meet interest obligations 
as well as of other dimensions of creditworthiness as 
measured by objective rating or scoring systems.
A different model of borrower-lender relations 
has often prevailed in emerging-market countries. 
This model involves practices which go by names 
such as policy or directed lending, relationship or 
name lending and collateral-based lending. As part of 
such practices loans are made on the basis of criteria 
different from those of the underlying premises of 
Basel 2. The assumptions about risk sharing between 
a bank and its borrowers involve a relationship that 
is less arms-length and in some cases more like an 
equity investment.
It is often pointed out by commentators in 
developed countries that relationship lending can 
degenerate into “crony capitalism”. This is true but 
the alternative banking models now prevalent in 
many developed countries also have their downside. 
Relationship lending’s opposite, arms-length bank-
ing, with its reliance on quantitative criteria derived 
from supposedly scientific approaches to finance and 
with its de-emphasis on long-term relations between 
banks and their customers, pushed to its extreme, led 
to the financial turbulence engulfing major developed 
countries since mid-2007.
Where borrower-lender relations different from 
those assumed by Basel 2 are deeply rooted in na-
tional practices, the risks to economic activity and 
development from too an abrupt transition to Basel 2 
could be substantial. Especially in Asia but also to 
varying degrees in many other developing countries 
a major source of economic growth has been firms, 
often family-owned or -controlled, which would not 
necessarily achieve high credit ratings – and thus low 
weightings for credit risk under Basel 2 – according 
to objective, quantitative criteria. 
Two PricewaterhouseCoopers authorities on the 
capital regulation and risk management of banks have 
posed the following important question concerning 
Basel 2 and such firms: “Might the introduction of 
Basel II lead to a credit crunch, with banks less will-
ing to lend to these companies? As they provide the 
backbone of the emerging economies, and would find 
it difficult to turn to the capital markets for alterna-
tive sources of funds, what impact might this have 
on the economic development of these countries? 
These are issues which supervisors need to consider 
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countries across the region [Asia-Pacific]” (Matten 
and Trout, 2006: 268–269).
As to the question of whether there are dis-
cernible implications of Basel 2 for investment and 
growth in developing countries these are still early 
days. But there is some anecdotal evidence that in 
some countries banks are treating Basel 2 as a justi-
fication for tightening lending standards in the way 
warned against above. Changes in banks’ lending 
practices in response to the introduction of Basel 2 
are a subject which authorities in developing coun-
tries need to keep under close scrutiny, using policy 
space available to them to forestall banks’ adoption 
of potentially damaging lending practices.
IV.	 Basel	2,	securitization	and	financial	
turmoil 
Several commentators have raised the question 
whether Basel 2 has contributed to the outbreak of the 
financial crisis. The collapse in the value of certain 
financial assets, particularly securitized categories, 
and the associated seizing-up of major parts of the 
financial markets originated in the United States, 
subsequently spreading outwards to other countries 
and markets, mainly in Europe. However, in the 
United States only in July 2007 did the four bank-
ing regulators (the Federal Reserve, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration) announce agreement on the implementation 
of Basel 2. Thus the introduction of Basel 2 came too 
late to have influenced the crisis. However, the lack 
of adequate rules on securitization in Basel 1 did help 
to facilitate practices whose adverse consequences 
only became fully evident during the crisis.
Large-scale securitization of mortgage loans in 
the United States antedated Basel 1. Only in the 1990s 
did securitization spread to higher-risk assets such as 
subprime mortgages. The involvement of European 
banks in securitization also began to increase rapidly 
in the second half of the 1990s. There is evidence 
that as part of regulatory capital arbitrage banks 
securitized loans requiring relatively high capital 
charges for given levels of risk in order to economize 
on regulatory capital. This evidence is discussed by 
a working group of the Basel Committee itself in a 
1999 report on the effects of Basel 1 which attributed 
a major part of the expansion of the securitization 
of non-mortgage debt to regulatory capital arbitrage 
(BCBS, 1999: 3–4).
The lack of internationally agreed rules concern-
ing securitization exposures was regarded by banking 
regulators as a major weakness of Basel 1 and its 
remedy was a major objective of Basel 2. However, 
the drawn-out character of the negotiations on Basel 2 
meant that the Basel Committee’s concerns were not 
reflected early in the new millennium in new rules 
constraining the increasingly unsound structures as-
sociated with the “originate-to-distribute” model of 
securitization.1
While the omission of rules for securitization 
exposures from Basel 1 thus contributed to recent 
financial turbulence, the role should not be exag-
gerated. The expansion of “originate-to-distribute” 
took place in a period when opinion favoured non-
interference in financial markets. As the Governor of 
the Reserve Bank of India put it in a recent speech, 
“the balance [between markets and regulation] is 
right or wrong only ex-post ... when there is all round 
prosperity, everyone wants everything to be left to 
the markets; when things go wrong and there is pain, 
monetary and regulatory policies are invoked to save 
the situation” (Reddy, 2008a).
The expansion of “originate-to-distribute” was 
also an integral feature of the movement towards 
conglomeration in the financial sector in the United 
States which followed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act in 1999. In normal times the involvement of 
the financial holding companies after this reform in 
a broad range of different financial services might 
have served the purpose of risk diversification and 
lower volatility of earnings. But in conditions such 
as those witnessed since 2007 the involvement has 
simply multiplied financial enterprises’ exposures 
to different, often correlated sources of financial 
turbulence.
v.  Basel 2 and the agenda for 
regulatory reform
1.  Overview
Responsibility for surveillance of the financial 
reform agenda has been assigned to the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB). This body was established 
in April 2009 as the successor of the Financial Sta-
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to promote information exchange and cooperation 
between the regulators of a group of countries with 
important financial markets and multilateral financial 
institutions. The FSB includes as members countries 
of the Group of 20 which had not been members of 
the FSF as well as Spain and the European Com-
mission. (In the sequel references will be to the FSB 
or the FSF according to their respective roles in the 
enunciation of the principles in question. Where the 
responsibility is a historically shared one, the term 
“FSB/FSF” is used.) 
The FSB agenda is driven principally by the 
weaknesses in the framework of financial regulation 
and cross-border cooperation in developed countries 
indicated by the financial crisis. This is evident in the 
coverage of subjects in the FSB’s own overviews (for 
example, FSB, 2009a): 
strengthening the prudential framework for  1. 
financial institutions with recommendations 
on capital requirements, liquidity management, 
and a framework and tools for macroprudential 
regulation and supervision; 
strengthening risk management; 2. 
implementation of principles for executive  3. 
compensation in banks;
extension of the scope of financial regulation to  4. 
institutions, markets and products currently not 
properly covered (such as many customized or 
OTC derivatives and hedge funds);
revising accounting standards; 5. 
reforming the use of credit ratings and the opera- 6. 
tions of the credit rating agencies; 
improving cross-border cooperation between  7. 
supervisors, especially in the areas of crisis 
management and cross-border insolvencies of 
financial firms;
establishing arrangements for enhancing ad- 8. 
herence to internationally agreed regulatory 
standards. 
Although the Financial Stability Board and its 
predecessor, the Financial Stability Forum have ex-
pressed strong support for implementation of Basel 2, 
they have also acknowledged that the rules need to 
be revisited in the light of weaknesses revealed by 
the crisis. The BCBS has developed an agenda for 
strengthening the rules of Basel 2 in the following 
areas: (1) better coverage of banks’ risk exposures by 
minimum regulatory capital, particularly important 
under this heading being those of securitizations and 
of market risks in the trading book; (2) improvement 
in the quality of the regulatory capital corresponding 
to banks’ risks; (3) countercyclical capital buffers and 
provisions; and (4) introduction of a non-risk-based 
measure of regulatory capital designed to help to 
contain the degree of leverage in the banking sys-
tem (Bank for International Settlements, 2009; and 
Wellink, 2009).
However, it should also be noted that most of the 
subjects in the overall financial reform agenda men-
tioned above bear in one way or another on Basel 2, 
as is evident from the following points contained in 
this agenda:
Increased emphasis is now being given to con- • 
nections between liquidity, on the one hand, and 
capital or solvency, on the other. These con-
nections were dramatized by the cases of Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the solvency of 
which was shown by events in 2008 to depend 
on continuing access to short-term financing. 
There is now more explicit acknowledgement  • 
that the risks associated with banks’ exposures 
to derivatives are generally greater in the case 
of non-standardized OTC products lacking a 
central counterparty.
The quality of banks’ risk management depends  • 
on the way in which banks’ staff is remuner-
ated. 
Credit ratings enter at a number of points into  • 
the setting of Basel 2’s weights for credit risk, 
for example, the weights under the Standardized 
Approach and for securitization exposures.
International accounting rules determine the  • 
way in which the value of banks’ positions are 
measured and their reported profits estimated. 
The rules thus have an important bearing on 
banks’ risk management via the remuneration 
of their staff and their incentive structures, and 
on the consents of financial reporting under 
Pillar 3 of Basel 2.
Perhaps most importantly, running through  • 
much of the agenda for changes in Basel 2 as 
well as the overall agenda for financial reform 
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the microprudential regulation of individual 
financial institutions, which was originally the 
central concern of Basel 2 (as of Basel 1), and 
macroprudential regulation, which is intended 
to counter systemic risks. These relations are 
central to the proposed inclusion of counter-
cyclical buffers and provisions in the revised 
version of Basel 2. 
Better coverage in Basel 2 of banks’ risk ex-
posures is addressed in documents already issued 
by the BCBS concerning securitization exposures 
and the framework for market risk (BCBS, 2009a, 
2009b and 2009c). Under the heading of securitiza-
tion exposures banks are to conduct their own due 
diligence concerning the assets securitized, thus re-
ducing failures on this front observed in connection 
with the originate-to-distribute process during the 
credit crisis. For the purpose of estimating capital 
charges, the calibration of securitization exposures 
has been made more rigorous to take better account 
of the risks. Under the heading of market risk, the 
BCBS has increased the capital charge to take account 
of default risks to positions in banks’ trading books 
highlighted by recent experience.2 Work on the other 
items of Basel Committee’s agenda for Basel 2 – 
improvement in the quality of the regulatory capital, 
countercyclical capital buffers and provisions; and an 
overall leverage ratio is ongoing (and is discussed 
further below). 
2.  Liquidity risk
In September 2008, the BCBS published princi-
ples for the management and supervision of liquidity 
risk (BCBS, 2008). These principles focus on the 
practices of individual banks – their need for adequate 
liquidity cushions and for internal management which 
includes appropriate stress testing, plans for contin-
gency funding and management of off-balance-sheet 
as well as on-balance-sheet commitments. However, 
the oversight body of the Basel Committee, the Group 
of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision, 
have also decided that microprudential principles for 
liquidity risk need to be supplemented by guidelines 
addressing the relation between the liquidity risk of 
institutions and systemic financial risk. These will 
include a framework for the assessment of system-
wide liquidity risk which could serve as a basis for 
internalizing within individual banks the externalities 
which their activities create. 
3.  Central counterparties and OTC 
derivatives 
The prevailing view among regulators is that ex-
isting arrangements for the clearance and settlement 
of OTC derivatives are not conducive to transparency 
and stability. During the crisis regulators did not al-
ways know where risks associated with holdings of 
derivatives were concentrated. Moreover, provision 
of financial support by governments and central banks 
to individual financial firms was motivated in some 
cases by fear of the domino effects throughout the 
financial sector that the failure of a large holder of 
OTC derivatives might have on other firms through 
the network of their bilateral derivatives contracts 
(Scott, 2008: chapter 10). A major concern of both 
national regulators and the Financial Stability Board 
here is the currently opaque market for credit default 
swaps.3 Proposals for improving the transparency and 
security of such swaps as well other OTC derivatives 
have focused on the institutional and contractual 
infrastructure, special emphasis being given to ex-
tending the use of central counterparties (CCPs) for 
clearing and settlement. 
Clearing and settlement refer to the arrange-
ments for the completion of securities transactions. 
Clearing covers confirmation of the identity and 
quantity of the financial instrument or contract being 
bought or sold, the price and date, and the identity of 
buyer and seller. Clearing may also cover the netting 
of trades, i.e. the offsetting of the buy and sell orders 
of a single party. Settlement refers to payment to the 
seller and delivery or transfer of ownership of the 
financial instrument to the buyer. 
Derivative transactions can be strictly bilateral 
and subject to no external surveillance or control, 
as has been the case for several categories of OTC 
derivatives.4 In such cases, risk management (through 
collateralization, etc.) is also bilateral and transpar-
ency is at best limited. Greater transparency can be 
achieved if transactions are submitted to a central 
repository of information for OTC transactions. 
However, such a repository does not itself provide 
protection from the risk that a counterparty will not 
perform.
CCPs not only serve the function of information 
repository but also reduce credit risk by interposing 
themselves between the counterparties to transac-
tions, becoming the buyer to every seller and the 
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of domino defaults due the failure of one party to 
chain of bilateral derivatives contracts. If they are 
to serve this purpose, the CCPs’ procedures must be 
well designed and they must have capital and other 
access to financing which will enable them to meet 
the demand on their resources resulting from defaults. 
CCPs can be used in connection with OTC contracts 
or can take the form of clearinghouses for exchange-
traded contracts. In both cases, the contracts served 
by the CCP arrangements are subject to a measure 
of standardization, and in both cases participants in 
the arrangements must meet margin requirements. 
One difference between the CCP arrangements for 
OTC contracts, on the one hand, and exchange-traded 
contracts, on the other, concerns the parties covered 
– in the case of the former financial institutions and 
in the case of the latter, a more heterogeneous set 
of market participants reflecting the long history 
of exchange traded derivatives and the wider range 
of their coverage which includes commodities as 
well as exchange-rate, stock and government-bond 
futures. Another difference concerns transparency, 
information on prices being more widely available 
for exchange-traded contracts.5
The differing risks of alternative arrangements 
for clearing and settlement will be reflected in various 
features of regulatory reforms. Basel 2 is currently 
being revised so that minimum regulatory capital re-
quirements reflect more accurately the risk associated 
with the alternatives. The capital requirements can 
be expected to be lower for derivatives with markets 
served by CCPs. 
4.  Compensation
Unsurprisingly, in view of the high political 
profile of the issue, a reasonably comprehensive 
set of principles for compensation of executives 
by financial firms has already been issued by the 
FSB (FSB, 2009b). Key concepts underlying these 
principles are that total variable compensation (i.e. 
bonuses) should never compromise maintenance by 
the firm of a capital base which is consistent with the 
risks faced by the firm, and that decisions as to the 
size and allocation of variable compensation should 
take full account of these risks. Specific guidelines 
include the following:
Poor financial performance should lead to a  • 
contraction of variable compensation. This 
should include reductions in amounts previ-
ously earned, including malus or clawback 
arrangements.
In the case of senior executives and other em- • 
ployees whose actions have a material impact on 
the firm’s risk exposure, a substantial proportion 
of total compensation should be variable and 
performance-related. Moreover, a substantial 
proportion of variable compensation (40 to 
60 per cent) should be payable under arrange-
ments which defer payment over a period of not 
less than three years.
A substantial proportion of variable compen- • 
sation (a figure of at least 50 per cent being 
mentioned) should be awarded in shares or 
share-like instruments which align incentives 
with long-term value creation and risk.
The remainder of deferred compensation can  • 
be paid as cash which vests gradually and is 
subject to the clawback arrangements already 
mentioned.
In the event of government intervention to  • 
stabilize or rescue the firm supervisors should 
have the power to restructure compensation, 
and the compensation of the most highly paid 
employees should be subject to independent 
review and approval.
Guaranteed bonuses should not be part of  • 
prospective compensation plans. Existing 
contractual payments related to termination of 
employment should be maintained only if it is 
determined that they are aligned with long-term 
value creation and prudent risk-taking. 
The FSB principles also include obligations as 
to disclosure and the scope of supervisors’ responsi-
bilities for oversight. 
Implementation initiatives are under way. The 
Basel Committee has integrated the FSB principles 
into Pillar 2 of Basel 2. It has also conducted a survey 
of progress in implementation of the FSB principles, 
and has created a task force to promote consistent 
and effective implementation. Unsurprisingly, there 
is variation in the pace of implementation among 
countries. Such variation is leading to pressures from 
within the banking industry to dilute the principles 
because of concerns over their impact on the inter-
national competitiveness of different jurisdictions 
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with various items on the financial reform agenda) 
(FSB, 2009a: 14). Uniformity of implementation may 
also be complicated by differences in countries’ tax 
regimes for compensation in the form of deferred 
receipts of stock.
5.  Credit rating agencies 
Even before the crisis the standing of the agen-
cies was under pressure. Criticism focused on the 
sector’s concentration and the dominant role played 
by a small number of global institutions. The agen-
cies’ seal of approval is a key factor in the saleability 
of debt instruments, some categories of institutional 
investor actually being limited to instruments with 
a rating of investment grade, i.e. BBB or better. Yet 
in a number of cases involving firms such as Enron 
and Asian countries prior to 1997–1998, the agencies 
were considered to have been slow to identify the 
problems leading to insolvency or financial crises. 
The criticisms of the credit rating agencies have 
intensified since the outbreak of the current crisis in 
2007. The agencies played a key role in the “originate 
to distribute” process by their rating of securitized 
investment products, especially of the more complex 
structured products. High ratings were often accorded 
to such products on the basis of technically flawed 
analysis. The quality of the analysis was also often 
adversely affected by the conflicts of interest involved 
in a process which generated high fees for the agen-
cies but where banks could – and did – shop around 
for favourable ratings.
These weaknesses have led the FSF and the FSB 
to call for improvements in the technical quality of the 
rating process and improved management of conflicts 
of interest, especially those in ratings of structured 
products. They have also called for reduced reliance 
on credit ratings and for enhanced due diligence 
and credit analysis by banks and investors. Regula-
tors are to check that their rules are consistent with 
reduced reliance on the agencies ratings throughout 
the financial sector.
Under a new regulatory regime for credit rating 
agencies in the EU, all agencies will have to apply 
for registration and will have to comply with rules 
requiring: (1) avoidance of conflicts of interest due 
to their roles as advisers to banks on ratings as well 
as actual raters; (2) vigilance concerning the quality 
of rating methodology; (3) and acting in a trans-
parent manner. Ratings for the structured financial 
products which were at the heart of the crisis are to 
be differentiated from other ratings by the use of an 
additional symbol.
Regulatory reform in the United States is to 
include tighter regulation of credit rating agencies’ 
policies and procedures regarding subjects similar 
to those of the new EU regime. Another idea under 
consideration is that there should be increased civil li-
ability for credit rating agencies, a move long resisted 
by the agencies which maintain that it would conflict 
with their right to freedom of speech. Japan has also 
introduced reforms designed to achieve objectives 
similar to those of the EU and United States.
The Basel Committee is reviewing Basel 2’s 
use of credit ratings in its procedures for setting 
minimum regulatory charges for credit risk. In the 
context of Basel 2 as a global standard reliance on 
such ratings is most important under heading of the 
simplest Standardized Approach to setting minimum 
regulatory capital charges (see box 1), though ratings 
are also incorporated in other rules of the agreement 
such for the charges for securitization exposures. At 
present, the BCBS appears likely to stand by its deci-
sion to base some of its rules on the agencies’ ratings 
owing to inability to come up with an alternative – 
and presumably in the hope that ongoing reforms of 
the agencies will enhance ratings’ reliability.
It is not clear how important reform of the credit 
rating agencies will be to the application of Basel 2 
rules in most developing countries. The Standardized 
Approach includes a risk weight of 100 per cent – 
and thus a capital charge of 8 per cent – for loans 
to unrated borrowers, a category likely to include 
a large number of borrowers in such countries. For 
these borrowers, introduction of the Standardized Ap-
proach will not involve changes in banks’ minimum 
regulatory capital from the rules of Basel 1. From 
a longer-term point of view, the current motivating 
force of concern over the role of credit ratings in 
Basel 2, namely discredited practices of the major 
agencies in industrialized countries, may prove to be 
parochial since it fails to take into account the impact 
on the application of Basel 2 rules of the possible 
establishment of indigenous rating agencies in devel-
oping countries themselves. Indeed, it is reasonable 
to raise the question why countries which are increas-
ingly becoming formidable international competitors 
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establishing agencies capable of meeting the Basel 
Committee’s standards for external credit assessment 
institutions under the Standardized Approach. 
6.  Accounting consolidation and valuation
In its report of April 2008, setting out the agenda 
for financial reform, the Financial Stability Forum 
(FSF, 2008, chapter III), as part of its recommenda-
tions on enhancing transparency and valuation, drew 
attention to the need to strengthen accounting and 
disclosure standards for off-balance-sheet entities and 
to the problems associated with the accounting valu-
ation of financial instruments, especially of complex 
instruments and illiquid markets.
The work of the International Accounting Stand-
ards Board (IASB) and the United States Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) on off-balance-
sheet entities has been motivated by concerns similar 
to that of the BCBS on securitization in Basel 2. The 
rules of the accounting bodies include standards for 
what does or does not constitute consolidation for 
accounting purposes, while Basel 2 specifies the 
conditions which must be met if the securitized assets 
are to be removed from the exposures which must be 
included in its minimum regulatory capital require-
ments. Assuring consistency between accounting and 
supervisory rules on off-balance-sheet entities should 
involve no insuperable difficulties, although the rules 
of the IASB and FASB themselves are not completely 
consistent (Butler, 2009: 195–196). However, the 
application to a subject, consolidation, where firms 
have historically been creative in devising means of 
getting round rules and regulations, may still prove 
problematic.
Setting appropriate standards for the valuation 
of financial instruments requires solutions to more 
conceptually intractable problems. As a recent trea-
tise on accounting for financial instruments puts it, 
“Not only must the accountant know how to value 
financial instruments. He must also be able to under-
stand and disclose the ways in which they change the 
risk profile of an organization and report in a manner 
which complies with the most difficult and contro-
versial accounting standards ever written” (Butler, 
2009: 7). According to the traditional accounting 
model, some assets and liabilities are currently shown 
on the balance sheet at cost and others at market 
value or some approximation thereof. However, as 
the financial instruments and techniques used by 
financial (and large non-financial) firms have mul-
tiplied owing to innovation and the conglomeration 
of different activities in single financial enterprises, 
the rules governing the choice of accounting options 
have grown increasingly complex (see box 3). 
The approach to reform advocated by the many 
commentators who view accounting standards as 
solely or mainly a tool to enable decision making by 
investors is to reinforce rules requiring fair valuation 
of assets and liabilities (fair value being defined in 
the IASB’s International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards as “the amount for which an asset could be 
exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledge-
able, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction”). 
But this approach, though superficially plausible, 
entails several problems. 
The approach glozes over the multiple roles of 
accounting, for example, in firms’ corporate govern-
ance and internal controls whose requirements may 
differ from those of the provision of information 
for investors. It implicitly assumes that reasonably 
straightforward methods of estimating fair values are 
always available – if not on the base of market prices, 
then through the use of firms’ own models. However, 
in illiquid markets such methods may be fraught with 
uncertainty, and for some items, especially complex 
financial instruments, the firm’s models can them-
selves serve as the basis for creative accounting and 
thus misleading estimates of profit and loss. 
Moreover, the application of fair valuation can 
aggravate financial instability and the procyclical be-
haviour of banks.6 In a report on procyclicality in the 
financial system, the FSF drew attention to the way 
in which fair-value accounting “encouraged market 
practices that contributed to excessive risk-taking or 
risk-shedding activity in response to observed chang-
es in asset prices …When the markets for many credit 
risk exposures became illiquid over 2007-08, credit 
spreads widened substantially as liquidity premia 
grew … Wider spreads drove down mark-to-market 
valuations on a range of assets … The extensive 
use of fair value accounting meant that, across the 
financial system, these declines translated into lower 
earnings or accumulated unrealized losses … Mark-
to-market losses eroded banks’ core capital, causing 
balance sheet leverage to rise. Banks sold assets in 
an attempt to offset this rise in balance sheet leverage 
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pushed credit spreads wider, causing more mark-to-
market losses” (FSF, 2009b: 26; Committee on the 
Global Financial System, 2009: 14). 
The recommendations of the FSF to standard 
setters and prudential supervisors concerning rules 
for accounting cover: (1) the difficulty of estimating 
fair values when the market data and the model-
ling required are inadequate for this purpose; and 
(2) changes in accounting rules which would mitigate 
the contribution of fair value accounting to “adverse 
price dynamics” (i.e. procyclicality). The recommen-
dations cover the following subjects:
the use of valuation reserves or adjustments for  • 
financial instruments as protection against the 
consequences of highly uncertain fair values;
changes in the underlying accounting model  • 
to reduce the complexity of existing rules for 
financial instruments;
a review of rules covering transfers between  • 
the accounting categories for financial assets to 
avoid procyclical effects of fair-value account-
ing during periods of severe illiquidity;
simplification of the requirements for the recog- • 
nition of hedge accounting. The complexity of 
existing requirements is thought to deter more 
widespread use of hedge accounting to smooth 
fluctuations in profit and loss due to the applica-
tion of fair valuation. 
For its part, the Basel Committee in a statement 
on guiding principles for the replacement of the 
Box 3
AccOUNTING vAlUATION FOR FINANcIAl INSTRUMENTS 
For accounting purposes, financial instruments are classified as belonging to one of three categories: (1) loans 
and receivables and other assets held to maturity; (2) items held for trading and items to which the fair value 
option applies; and (3) assets available for sale. 
Items under (1) are shown on the balance sheet at amortized cost. Trading items under (2) are usually held 
on a short-term basis for speculation or as part of broker- dealer activities. These items are shown on the 
balance sheet at fair value (see main text) and changes in this value go through profit and loss. The fair value 
option allows firms also to show selected other instruments at fair value, changes in which go through profit 
and loss. This option is available for items which, owing to measurement or recognition inconsistencies, 
might otherwise be a source of artificial volatility of earnings if carried on the balance sheet at amortized 
cost. Available-for-sale is a residual category for items (not including derivatives) to which the other two 
accounting categories do not apply. For balance-sheet purposes, these are valued at their fair value but 
changes do not go through profit and loss until the items are sold. 
Fair value hedges enable the use of derivatives to control the fair value of balance-sheet items. If a derivative 
qualifies as a fair-value hedge, changes in the value of the item hedged are adjusted to take account of 
changes in the value of the derivative. The objective of such hedges is to reduce earnings volatility since 
only the change in value reflecting the ineffective part of the hedge goes through profit and loss. Cash flow 
hedges enable the hedging of future cash flows. If a derivative qualifies as a cash-flow hedge, changes in 
its value do not go through profit and loss until the period when the forecasted hedged transaction is also 
recorded in earnings. In both cases, the derivatives used for hedging must meet stringent criteria. Qualifying 
hedges of foreign exchange gains and losses on net investment in foreign entities and operations may also 
be subject to special accounting treatment.
Many firms have proved reluctant to use hedge accounting to reduce earnings volatility owing to complexity 
of the rules and the extensive documentation required under international and United States accounting. 
Moreover, in the illiquid markets of the credit crisis the value of many hedging instruments themselves 
experienced increased volatility, thus reducing their usefulness for hedging (Committee on the Global 
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International Accounting Standard for the recognition 
and measurement of financial instruments (IAS 39) 
has also supported exceptions to the application of 
fair value (BCBS, 2009d). It advocates the following: 
linking bank accounting to the bank’s business model 
and risk-management strategy and practices and to 
the economic substance of its transactions; reducing 
the complexity of relevant rules; and delinking fair 
values from income and profit recognition when there 
is considerable valuation uncertainty.
Revisions of international accounting standards 
recently proposed by the IASB have not so far taken 
on board the recommendations of the FSF and FSB 
(IASB, 2009b). Under new proposals, the IASB has 
reaffirmed the principle that financial assets should 
be measured at fair value or amortized cost, with the 
objective of simplifying application of the principle 
rather of than making it more flexible. Classifica-
tion of assets would be based on the firm’s business 
model for measuring financial instruments and the 
instruments’ contractual cash flows. To qualify for 
measurement at amortized costs, the instruments 
should have the basic features of a loan. Otherwise, 
they should be measured in accordance with fair 
valuation. Reclassification between the categories 
of amortized cost and fair value would be permitted 
only in response to changes in the firm’s business 
model. The proposals would appear to not to offer 
the flexibility as to reclassification proposed in the 
recommendations of the FSB. Moreover, there is no 
mention of the use of valuation reserves or adjust-
ments when markets are illiquid and usual estimation 
methods provide a weak basis for valuation. The pro-
posals of the IASB thus suggest that agreement may 
be difficult on the flexibility regarding valuation for 
which financial regulators are pushing via the FSB. 
Fair value is important in Basel 2 since it is 
the basis for valuing exposures in both banking and 
trading books (para.718 (xcx)) of the version of 
Basel 2 which incorporates post-2006 revisions as 
reproduced in BCBS, 2009c: 26–29). However, the 
application of fair value in Basel 2 is subject to ad 
hoc adjustments. In particular, banks are to adjust 
fair values to allow for differences in the degree of 
positions’ liquidity. This would appear to be consist-
ent with the recommendations of the FSB concerning 
the need for valuation reserves or adjustments to take 
account of increased uncertainty as to fair value in 
illiquid markets. However, such adjustments or re-
serves do not currently figure in the new proposals 
of the IASB.
Developing countries will be affected by the 
changes in accounting rules which are part of the 
agenda for financial reform. In several of these coun-
tries, the strengthening of accounting standards for 
banks has been closely linked to the introduction of 
Basel 2 and this connection can be expected to con-
tinue. Revisions of the accounting for the valuation 
of financial assets will thus require adjustments to 
the supervisory rules and guidelines accompanying 
introduction of Basel 2 and complicate the tasks of 
authorities in developing countries accordingly. 
7.  Countercyclical buffers in a 
macroprudential framework
The focus of a macroprudential framework is 
damage from adverse developments to the economy 
as a whole – real as well as financial activity – as op-
posed to the concern of traditional microprudential 
orientation with individual financial institutions. As 
the Governor of the Bank of Canada put it in a re-
cent speech, [under the microprudential approach to 
reform] “protect the banks from the economic cycle; 
in other words, make each bank, individually, more 
resilient” and [under the macroprudential approach] 
“protect the cycle from the banks; that is make the 
system as a whole more resilient” (Carney, 2009). An 
issue central to strengthening the macroprudential 
framework is the procyclicality embedded in regu-
latory rules. The macroprudential perspective also 
includes subjects which are related to development 
policy (see below).
Procyclicality denotes the dynamic interactions 
between financial and real activity whereby busi-
ness-cycle fluctuations are amplified and financial 
instability in turn is exacerbated (FSF, 2009a: 8). The 
danger that Basel 2 might aggravate procyclicality 
arises because the rules of Basel 2 are intended to 
align regulatory capital requirements more closely 
with economic capital, i.e. the amount of capital 
considered to be appropriate as a buffer against 
unidentified future losses in abstraction from regu-
latory rules, and thus with banks’ actual practices 
with respect to the control and pricing of credit risk 
– practices which are notoriously procyclical. 
That procyclicality might be increased by the 
rules of Basel 2 has been recognized during the draft-
ing process. Through-the-cycle estimates of the key 
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hoped, mitigate this danger. Moreover, adjustments 
were made to the formula for credit risk to reduce 
its sensitivity to changes in the probability of default 
(Cornford, 2005: 27–28). More recently, in response 
to the recent turmoil, the macroprudential dimen-
sion of regulatory and supervisory frameworks has 
attracted much increased greater attention leading to 
additional efforts to root out or dampen the procycli-
cality embedded in regulatory rules. 
Under the heading of prudential regulations 
directed at reducing procyclicality in the financial 
system capital requirements and loss provisioning are 
closely related. In the design of Basel 2, subject to 
certain restrictions, loss provisions can be included in 
regulatory capital up to specified limited limits. Like 
capital, loss provisioning is capable of contributing 
to procyclicality. Evidence for the United States indi-
cates that loss provisions fall as a percentage of loan 
volume during periods of rapid economic growth and 
rise during downturns (FSF, 2009a). The increases in 
provisions during downturns are capable of lower-
ing retained earnings, capital and lending, while the 
decreases during expansions are capable of having 
converse effects. 
Recommendations of the FSF concerning 
countercyclical buffers are directed at capital, provi-
sioning and leverage (FSF, 2009b). Countercyclical 
capital buffers and an overall leverage ratio as part of 
Basel 2, have already been mentioned under the cur-
rent agenda of the Basel Committee (in section V.1). 
Other closely related recommendations of the FSF 
for mitigating procycliocality concern revision of the 
framework for market risk of Basel 2 to reduce reli-
ance on cyclical Value-at-Risk (VaR)-based estimates 
of regulatory capital, stress testing and monitoring 
of Basel 2’s rules to ensure that they dampen rather 
than amplify procyclicality.
The rules on countercyclical capital buffers are 
to cover the mechanisms for triggering increases and 
decreases in capital, the capital instruments involved, 
and the question of whether regulation should target 
overall levels of capital or that allocated to particular 
categories of exposure. 
On trigger mechanisms a major question is 
whether greater weight should be given to regulatory 
rules, on the one hand, or to regulatory discretion, 
on the other.
The proposal of a group assembled by the Ge-
neva International Centre for Monetary and Banking 
Studies and the London Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, whose proposals for countercyclical re-
visions to Basel 2 are part of a larger agenda for 
financial reform, is for a laddered response of regu-
latory levels to the credit cycle, an approach which 
would prioritize rules over discretion (Brunnermeier 
et al., 2009: chapter 4). The laddered response would 
be to divergences between actual and target macro-
prudential levels of regulatory capital (greater than 
those of Basel 2), which would be estimated on the 
basis of indicators whose fluctuations have potential 
implications for systemic risk, such as leverage, 
maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities, 
and the expansion (or contraction) of lending and 
asset prices. 
Dynamic provisioning, another approach often 
raised in the context of countercyclical regulation 
of capital although it targets loss provisions rather 
than capital as such, also deploys regulatory rules 
in preference to discretion. Such provisioning is 
designed to reflect credit risks and credit losses that 
accumulate in loan portfolios in boom periods before 
they become apparent in downturns. The resulting 
general loss provisions (i.e. provisions reflecting 
expected future losses on a loan portfolio as a whole 
and not the performance of individual loans) dimin-
ish during the downturns as they become associated 
with specific loans, adding to specific loss provisions 
but preserving capital at levels above regulatory 
minima and thus, it is intended, mitigating declines 
in bank lending. The much cited version of dynamic 
provisioning pioneered by the Spanish authorities 
puts its principal emphasis on the indicator of actual 
as opposed to long-run average credit growth for the 
purpose of estimating target loss provisions (Com-
mittee on the Global Financial System, 2009: 15; 
Brunnermeier et al., 2009: 34). 
Within the regulatory community there is sup-
port for judgement, and thus also for discretion, in 
applying rules on countercyclical capital buffers. The 
judgement would be reached by regulators on the basis 
of a comprehensive set of macroprudential indicators 
which would include those in the two rules-based ap-
proaches described above (Tucker, 2009: 9–10). 
Concerning the categories of capital which 
would be included in the countercyclical buffers there 
is a consensus that it should be mainly Tier 1 equity 
capital, and that it should not include other items such 
as the subordinated debt also qualifying as capital 
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widespread interest has been expressed in the idea of 
including in the countercyclical capital buffers debt 
instruments, so-called contingent convertible (CoCo) 
bonds, whose trigger for conversion into equity 
would be a preassigned level of a regulatory indicator 
such as the bank’s capital ratio. A practical example 
of such an instrument is the recent issue of enhanced 
capital notes (ECNs) amounting to GBP 16 billion 
by Lloyds Bank in exchange for other debt instru-
ments. However, if such bonds are to be included in 
countercyclical capital buffers, regulators will need 
to be confident that their costs will be low enough 
for them to be an attractive option, and will have to 
decide what form or forms the regulatory triggers 
should take. In the debate on such bonds misgivings 
have also been expressed that simultaneous trigger-
ing for conversion of the bonds at several banks in 
volatile financial markets could also actually trigger 
financial panic (Sakoul, 2009; Tett, 2009).
Commentary on countercyclical capital buff-
ers has tended to focus on managing changes in 
aggregate capital. However, within the regulatory 
community there is apparently scepticism concern-
ing reliance on this approach. Suppose, for example, 
that minimum aggregate capital requirements were 
raised during a credit boom which, as is frequently 
the case, involved primarily particular sectors or fi-
nancial instruments. The reaction of the banks might 
simply be to reduce lending to less exuberant sectors 
or instruments, while continuing to lend on relaxed 
terms to the more exuberant ones i.e. those driving the 
boom. Ways of dealing with this problem currently 
under consideration include limiting countercyclical 
variations in minimum capital ratios to the problem-
atic classes of exposure as well as variations in the 
permitted haircuts (discounts with respect to nominal 
values) for collateral used in secured lending under 
the problematic headings – collateral which would 
typically be experiencing values inflated by the exu-
berance of a credit boom (Tucker, 2009). 
The FSF’s recommendations earlier this year 
concerning loss provisioning were directed partly at 
the framework underlying existing rules: the IASB 
and the United States FASB were to issue a state-
ment reiterating the need for the use of judgement to 
determine losses for provisioning purposes; and the 
two bodies were to reconsider the existing model for 
incurred losses with a view to incorporating a broader 
range of available information (FSF, 2009b: 19–21). 
Motivating these recommendations is the FSF’s view 
that earlier recognition of losses than that required 
under the current provisioning model could have 
reduced procyclicality in the current crisis. Other 
recommendations of the FSF regarding provisioning 
were that the Basel Committee should undertake re-
views of Basel 2 to reduce or eliminate disincentives 
for establishing appropriate provisions for loan losses 
and to assess the adequacy of disclosure concerning 
loan-loss provisioning under Pillar 3 of Basel 2. 
As part of its revision of standards on financial 
instruments, the IASB has recently published propos-
als on loss provisioning (IASB, 2009a). Under these 
proposals, there would be a move away from the 
existing method which focuses on current incurred 
loss impairment toward one based on expected losses. 
This method would recognize expected losses when 
the asset in question is acquired and throughout the 
life of the asset with reassessment at each account-
ing period. 
These proposals are a move in the direction of 
the recommendations of the FSF. By prescribing ear-
lier recognition of losses, the proposals would reduce 
the negative and procyclical impact on the profit and 
loss account under current accounting practice of 
sharp rises in incurred losses at the beginning of cycli-
cal downturns. Loss provisioning under the IASB’s 
proposals would not be part of countercyclical capital 
buffers as such but would none the less contribute 
to the same objective of reducing procyclicality. 
Similarly the IASB’s proposals should remove ac-
counting objections to the build-up of provisions for 
loan losses during cyclical upturns which is required 
for dynamic provisioning. It should be recalled that 
the IASB’s proposals are still at the stage of an expo-
sure draft. The period for comments and finalization 
of rules here means that a new standard will not be 
issued before 2010 and will not be mandatory before 
about three years later. 
vI. The experience of selected 
developing countries 
Most of the problems of introducing Basel 2 
are common to all countries but some can be more 
severe in developing countries owing to less adequate 
supervisory capacity, less developed internal con-
trols within banks themselves, and the shortage of 
infrastructure such as data on credit risks and credit 
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Basel 2 in some developing countries (India, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka) are described below. Of particular 
interest, here are ways in which attempts have already 
been made in these countries to address issues on the 
agenda of financial reform such as the procyclicality 
of Basel 2, which are discussed above in section V.
1.  India
Basel 2, like its predecessor, Basel 1, has been 
introduced in a context of continuous upgrading of 
India’s system of financial regulation. Some of the 
measures in this upgrading are directed at reducing 
the cyclicality of bank lending (Leeladhar, 2007a and 
2007b; and Reddy, 2008b). 
In 2002, banks were advised to build up within  • 
five years an Investment Fluctuation Reserve 
amounting to a specified proportion of their 
financial assets as a countercyclical prudential 
requirement which would facilitate their capac-
ity to absorb the effects of increases in interest 
rates. The target for this reserve was 5 per cent 
of assets in the categories of Held for Trading 
and Available for Sale (see box 3). This counter-
cyclical regulatory requirement is considered as 
having assisted banks during the rises in interest 
rates beginning in late 2004.
Banks are required to use mark-to-market in  • 
estimating changes in the value of assets Held 
for Trading and Available for Sale. Provision is 
to be made for net losses but net gains are not 
to be included in profits.
Credit risk weights for minimum regulatory  • 
capital requirements have been varied (mostly 
in an upward direction) for lending to sectors 
such as real estate, mortgage-backed securities, 
and consumer credit which are particularly 
sensitive to the business cycle. In the case of 
real estate, the increases in credit risk weights 
were accompanied by tightening of rules on 
exposure limits and collateral. At the same time, 
risk weights for housing loans below a certain 
ceiling were reduced.
Prudential norms for loan loss provisioning for  • 
exposures to real estate, personal loans, credit 
receivables and loans resulting in exposures to 
capital markets have been tightened in response 
to credit growth. 
Other noteworthy features of recent Indian 
upgrading of regulations related to capital standards 
and risk management are the following: (1) the mini-
mum regulatory capital requirement is 9 per cent of 
risk-weighted assets – i.e. higher than the Basel 2 
minimum of 8 per cent – and banks are expected to 
operate at levels well above this; (2) conservative 
guidelines have been issued for minimum regulatory 
capital requirements for securitization exposures; 
(3) comprehensive guidelines have been issued for 
the Internal Capital Adequacy Process (ICAAP) 
under Pillar 2 (supervisory review) of Basel 2 which 
is designed to capture all material risks to banks, 
including those not covered or not fully covered by 
the weights for credit, market and operational risks 
under Pillar 1.
To control banks exposure to liquidity risk, 
guidelines have been issued to limit banks’ vulner-
ability to changes in conditions in interbank lending 
and in the money markets. These take the form of 
ceilings on banks’ interbank liabilities as a proportion 
of their net worth as well as on banks’ access to the 
market for call money as both lenders and borrowers. 
Interesting in the context of the credit crisis in major 
developed countries are guidelines regarding banks’ 
exposure to non-government securities. The cover-
age of these guidelines includes listing and rating 
requirements, prudential limits, internal controls, the 
role of boards, disclosure, and trading and settlement 
procedures. In the case of non-government securities, 
banks are advised not to be guided solely by the rat-
ings of credit rating agencies but to carry out their 
own appraisals as in the case of direct lending.
In the context of introducing Basel 2, India must 
also confront problems due to the small number (four) 
of credit rating agencies and to the limitation of the 
agencies’ ratings to financial instruments as opposed 
to issuing entities. The authorities are aware of the 
danger that unrated entities may be handicapped 
under the rules of Basel 2 in their attempts to obtain 
bank credit so that special measures to maintain the 
credit flow to such borrowers may be necessary.
2.  Pakistan
As in many other developing countries, the in-
troduction of Basel 2 should be viewed in the context 
of broader reforms of the financial sector. In addresses 
concerning these reforms, a Governor of the State 
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upgrading of corporate governance of banks. Some 
of the subjects under this heading such as limits on 
banks’ exposures to single borrowers and to groups 
of related borrowers are an integral component of the 
prudential regime for banks of which Basel 2 is also 
a part (Akhtar, 2006a, 2006b and 2008).
Recurring subjects of the addresses of the Gov-
ernor are the small number of credit rating agencies 
(two) in Pakistan and the consequent problem of 
accessing the information required by Basel 2, the 
danger that Basel 2 will contribute to procyclicality 
in banks’ lending, and the possibility that Basel 2 will 
further restrict the access to finance of sectors, firms 
and individuals already underserved. 
On procyclicality, the emphasis of the Governor 
is on the use of supervisors’ discretionary powers 
under Pillar 2 (supervisory review) to demand that 
banks accumulate additional capital during economic 
expansions which will be available to cushion the 
effects on lending of decreases during downturns. 
Restrictions on access to financing in contradiction 
with the thrust of the country’s development policy 
are to be countered by reviews of credit scoring 
mechanisms as they apply to small businesses and 
the poor – mechanisms which the Governor clearly 
believes are currently unsatisfactory.
3.  Sri Lanka
Here too the introduction of Basel 2 should 
be viewed as part of a programme of upgrading 
the corporate governance and risk management of 
banks, a programme which the Deputy Governor 
of the Central Bank denotes with the acronym GRC 
– Governance, Risk Management and Compliance 
(Jayamaha, 2008).
The setting of minimum capital requirements 
for banks in Sri Lanka has been accompanied by 
measures designed to reinforce their effects.
The minimum regulatory capital requirement  • 
of 10 per cent of risk-weighted assets under 
the Sri Lankan version of Basel 1 (as opposed 
to the 8 per cent prescribed in Basel 1 itself) is 
to be retained under Basel 2. Waivers are to be 
granted only in accordance with strict criteria.
The rules of Basel 2 regarding the granting  • 
of preferentially low risk weights to loans 
qualifying for the retail portfolio have been 
adjusted to meet local conditions for retail and 
SME loans.
To counter procyclicality of bank lending, the  • 
authorities favour encouraging banks to build 
up capital buffers in good times to help stabilize 
lending during economic downturns. 
To avoid the danger that Basel 2 will lead to  • 
restrictions on lending to firms with low credit 
ratings under the Standardized Approach to 
credit risk, the authorities are permitting flex-
ibility regarding the application of such ratings. 
In the absence of such flexibility, they acknowl-
edge that there will be an incentive to firms not 
to submit to credit rating, a practice which they 
wish to promote (Jayamaha, 2006). 
vII. The new macroprudential focus and 
development
Basel 2 was not intended to be developmental. 
Indeed, it is questionable whether an international 
agreement on prudential rules for banks should or 
could explicitly target developmental objectives. 
Such targeting would presuppose an international 
consensus – which is lacking – on the relationship 
between banking models, on the one hand, and 
development, on the other. Nevertheless, an agree-
ment intersecting with as many aspects of banking 
practice as Basel 2 inevitably has implications for 
both development and development policy. Such 
implications are evident in the observations in sec-
tion III concerning the dangers for development of 
an inflexible introduction of Basel 2, and they are 
part of measures to accompany the introduction of 
Basel 2 adopted in a number of developing countries 
(such as India discussed in section VI).
The emphasis in the current financial reform 
agenda on macroprudential as opposed to principally 
microprudential regulation opens the way to incor-
poration in the agenda of developmental dimensions. 
According to the characterisation in a recent paper 
of the Bank for International Settlements, the macro-
prudential orientation of regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks “would focus policy on the damage to 
the system as a whole ... with a particular eye to the 
impact on the real economy. Here, common expo-
sures across financial institutions to macroeconomic 
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into account the impact of the collective behaviour 
of economic agents on aggregate risk” (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2008: 3–4).
The proximate objective of macroprudential 
policies is specified in the paper of the Bank for 
International Settlements as limiting system-wide 
distress, and the ultimate objective as avoiding output 
costs linked to financial instability. These objectives 
were no doubt drafted primarily with the relations 
between traditional features of macroeconomic sta-
bility and prudential supervision in mind. However, 
in emerging-market and other developing countries 
output costs as a feature of the macroeconomy cannot 
be abstracted from development policy any more than 
development policy can be abstracted from policies 
belonging to the macroprudential framework. 
In any immediate perspective, the practical impli-
cation of this broadening of the prudential perspective 
should concern the way in which Basel 2 is introduced 
in different countries. Basel 2 is not a binding inter-
national agreement and its rules (which, as explained 
above, are still being revised in the light of recent 
experience) accommodate considerable flexibility as 
to the way in which they are implemented. This leaves 
it up to countries to ensure that their choices as to 
the way in which Basel 2 is introduced are consistent 
with their development priorities. 
In a longer term perspective, one can envis-
age eventual inclusion in the supervisory review of 
Pillar 2 of guidelines covering features of Basel 2’s 
interactions with policies with a developmental 
dimension. Possible subjects for such guidelines 
would be dimensions of macroprudential (and mi-
croprudential) risks more commonly encountered in 
developing than developed countries and appropriate 
ways of measuring and controlling them.
vIII. The representativeness of the Basel 
committee and the role of developing 
countries in agreements on capital 
standards
Since the second half of the 1990s, increasingly 
insistent questions have been raised concerning the 
representativeness of the BCBS now that its work, 
especially that on Core Principles for Effective Bank-
ing supervision (BCBS, 1997) and on Basel 2, have 
clearly established its status as a global standard 
setter and not just standard setter for banks in G10 
countries. Some critics have even questioned the le-
gitimacy of the BCBS’s role as global standard setter 
owing to the narrowness of its membership.
The case for the longstanding limitation of the 
BCBS’s membership to a group of mainly Euro-
pean developed countries rested principally on two 
arguments: (1) the need to avoid expansion of the 
Committee to a size which would be unwieldy and 
compromise the Committee’s efficiency; and (2) the 
need to maintain the Committee’s credibility with the 
financial sector. The case for extension of the Com-
mittee’s membership to the larger emerging-market 
countries and to other countries which might repre-
sent important constituencies such as major offshore 
centres and Islamic banking was that such an exten-
sion would align the Committee’s membership more 
closely with the newly emergent structure of world 
banking and financial markets. Such an extension, it 
was argued, would enhance rather than diminish the 
Committee’s credibility. Moreover, within an enlarged 
Committee agreement should be possible on ways of 
avoiding unwieldy methods of working.
Acknowledgement of the need for a new frame-
work of global cooperation on financial regulation 
as part of the response to the financial crisis has 
now led to an extension of the BCBS’s membership 
in two stages in 2009. In March, Australia, Brazil, 
China, India, the Republic of Korea, Mexico and the 
Russian Federation became members, and in June re-
maining non-member economies of the G20, namely 
Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 
Turkey, were also invited to join together with Hong 
Kong (China) and Singapore. 
The extension of the Committee’s member-
ship to all G20 countries seems likely to reflect to a 
significant extent the role now attributed to the G20 
as the principal forum for the global coordination of 
economic policy, while the invitations to Hong Kong 
(China) and Singapore are due to their importance 
as international financial centres. Overall, relations 
between the BCBS and countries not represented 
will continue to be maintained via regional super-
visory groups and international conferences. More 
specifically regarding rules on capital, the principal 
vehicle for cooperation and consultation will be the 
Committee’s International Liaison Group which 
also includes Chile, Czech Republic, Poland, the 
West African Monetary Union, the European Com-
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Stability Institute, the Association of Supervisors 
of Banks of the Americas and the Islamic Financial 
Services Board. 
It is difficult to assess in advance how effective 
the new structure for cooperation on banking stand-
ards will be in assuring that proper account is taken 
of the views of countries which are not members of 
the BCBS. The new structure is unlikely completely 
to silence critics of the Committee’s unrepresenta-
tiveness. However, in view of its reflection of the 
global distribution of political and financial power, 
the new membership seems unlikely to be changed 
any time soon. 
IX. Other features of the changed 
regulatory landscape 
As indicated in section II, the global introduc-
tion of Basel 2 will be accompanied by divergences 
at the country level due to choices regarding the 
multiple options under Pillar 1 for minimum regu-
latory capital requirements for credit, market and 
operational risk as well as to variation in different 
countries’ timetables for adoption and in other rules 
for introduction. Thus, global regulation of banks’ 
capital after the introduction of Basel 2 will remain 
something of a patchwork. Such an outcome com-
promises the second of Basel 2’s major objectives, 
namely the achievement of a reasonable measure of 
cross-border competitive equality among banks – the 
so-called “level playing field” – by contributing to 
cross-border consistency in the regulation of banks’ 
capital. However, such a patchwork is not necessarily 
an unfavourable outcome for developing countries 
since it entails recognition of countries’ need for 
space in which to adopt policies regarding banks’ 
capital and risk management adapted to national 
needs.
A complete assessment of the likely eventual 
impact of Basel 2 would need to take account not 
only of the ongoing revisions of the agreement which 
were discussed in section V but also of other subjects 
which likely to be part of national or the international 
reform agendas but have less direct links to capital 
standards. Under this heading, one might single out 
the following areas for consideration: (1) limitations 
on the size of financial firms; (2) restrictions on their 
activities; (3) expansion of the perimeter of super-
vision to institutions currently either unsupervised 
or subject to exceptionally light supervision; and 
(4) a resolution mechanism for failing financial firms 
which are systemically important and thus in today’s 
world almost by definition cross-border.7 
Reforms under the first two headings, owing to 
differences in countries’ banking histories and in the 
activities traditionally carried out by different cat-
egories of financial firm, are likely to be the outcome 
of national initiatives rather than of agreed interna-
tional rules. Nevertheless, such reforms are likely to 
have close connections to the rules of Basel 2. For 
example, the vehicle chosen for limitations on firm 
size may well be a rule that regulatory capital should 
increase with size. Restrictions on banks’ activities, 
which may take the form of separating commercial 
banking from at least some of the activities tradition-
ally associated with investment banking, would be 
associated with limitations on the types of exposure 
and thus risks which the bank could assume. The 
connections between Basel 2 and reforms under the 
third and fourth headings are likely to be less direct. 
Nevertheless, such reforms will affect banks’ credit 
and market risks but in ways which are difficult to 
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Notes
 1  In the “originate-to-distribute” model debts generated or 
originated by one institution are pooled and transferred 
to a special purpose vehicle. The assets in this vehicle 
serve as the backing for securities sold to investors, often 
in tranches carrying returns that vary according to their 
different degrees of risk. For a more detailed discussion of 
the role of this model in the financial crisis, see Cornford, 
2009b: section 8C.
 2  For a commentary on these 2009 documents of the Basel 
Committee, see Cornford (2009a).
 3  A credit default swap is a derivative directed at the risk 
that a specified entity (single-name) or specified entities 
(multi-name) will “default”. Following a default event 
covered by the contract of the credit default swap the 
protection buyer receives a payment from the protection 
seller to compensate for credit losses, and in return pays 
a premium to the seller until maturity or the default event. 
After issuance credit default swaps are traded on secondary 
markets. 
 4  The account which follows of alternative arrangements for 
the clearing and settlement of derivative transaction makes 
extensive use of Cecchetti, Gyntelberg and Hollanders 
(2009).
 5  Multiplication of the number of CCPs justified in the 
name of competition or providing different regions or 
countries with their own CCPs may actually render them 
less effective for the achievement of their major purposes. 
Exchange among the CCPs of information concerning 
trading and positions would be required for the purpose 
of consolidation, thus raising the costs of transparency. 
Contract standardization and the multilateral netting of 
positions would require coordination across CCPs. Lack 
of regulatory consistency between CCPs could act as an 
incentive for regulatory arbitrage. The cost to members 
(margin payments, contributions to the equity capital of the 
CCPs, etc.) could well rise with the number of CCPs. 
 6  For a fuller discussion of the concept of procyclicality, see 
below.
 7  This classification of subject areas for consideration fol-
lows closely that of Truman (2009).
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